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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal requires us to interpr et the phrase, "invasion 
of the right of private occupancy," under Delawar e law and 
determine whether it is ambiguous. The phrase is widely 
used in insurance policies and has been the subject of 
heated litigation throughout the entire country over the 
past thirty years. Because Delaware case law pr ovides no 
clear precedent, both parties cite numer ous decisions 
outside the state. Some authority suggests that we should 
apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis and construe the 
phrase in relation to the more specific terms ("wrongful 
eviction" and "wrongful entry") pr eceding it. Such a ruling, 
however, would fly in the face of commonsense and declare 
unambiguous a term that has generated hundr eds of law 
suits and widely varying judicial interpretations. We refuse 
to do that, and instead hold that an "invasion of the right 
of private occupancy" is ambiguous and should be 
construed in favor of New Castle County. We therefore 




New Castle County is a political subdivision of the State 
of Delaware. It is responsible for , among other things, the 
permitting and zoning of real property within its 
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geographical borders. In order to pr otect itself, its officials, 
and its employees from legal liability, it is common practice 
for New Castle to purchase insurance. Between 1991 and 
1993, New Castle purchased a number of policies from 
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. The policies were of two general types: (1) 
Public Officials Liability ("POL") and (2) Commercial and 
General Liability ("CGL"). This appeal focuses on a CGL 
policy that New Castle purchased from National Union to 
cover the period from July 1, 1992 to July 1, 1993. 
 
The parties disagree whether National Union has an 
obligation to defend and indemnify New Castle in a number 
of law suits arising from zoning and per mitting decisions. 
In 1992, a Delaware real estate developer named Frank 
Acierno filed the first of three complaints, which eventually 
cost the County approximately one million dollars in legal 
expenses to defend. 
 
Acierno owns two tracts of land within New Castle 
County. The first is located near a shopping mall and the 
second is referred to as Westhampton. In 1992, New Castle 
frustrated Acierno's plans to develop both tracts. First, it 
denied a building permit for the mall pr operty, and second, 
it voided Acierno's record plan for the Westhampton 
property and instead rezoned it. 
 
On July 1, 1992, Acierno filed his first suit, contesting 
the denial of the building permit for the mall property 
("Acierno I"). He claimed, under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, that New 
Castle had deprived him of property without due process of 
law, and had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by arbitrarily treating him 
differently than other developers. The District Court 
granted preliminary injunctive relief in favor of Acierno. See 
Acierno v. Mitchell, 1992 WL 694590 (D. Del. 1992). We 
reversed, holding that the case was not ripe because the 
County Board of Adjustment had yet to rule on the building 
permit. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
One day after filing his first claim, Acier no filed a second 
suit, this time challenging New Castle's actions r egarding 
the Westhampton property ("Acierno II"). He again claimed 
he had suffered due process and equal protection 
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violations. A complicated series of rulings followed.1 
Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the County on most of Acierno's claims. A 
number of his claims, however, remain undecided. 
 
Acierno filed his third suit on December 17, 1993 
("Acierno III"). In it, he ar gued that his claim in Acierno I 
(regarding the mall property) had become ripe, because the 
County Board of Adjustment had refused to issue a 
building permit. The District Court again granted a 
preliminary injunction in his favor. See Acierno v. New 
Castle County, 1994 LEXIS 1683 (D. Del. 1994). W e 
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
See Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F .3d 645 (3d Cir. 
1994). On October 24, 1997, the parties settled Acierno III 
with an agreement requiring New Castle to issue a building 
permit for the mall property and pay Acierno's attorneys' 
fees up to $250,000. 
 
Shortly after Acierno filed his claims, the County 
attempted to contact National Union to discuss the POL 
and CGL policies. After almost a year of unsuccessful 
inquiries by New Castle, National Union sent a letter on 
June 25, 1993 stating that Acierno's claims"would not be 
covered under the CGL policy." However , on July 9, 1993, 
National Union indicated that it would tentatively 
undertake New Castle's defense under the POL policy. Its 
letter noted, in some detail, that National Union was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. First, the District Court granted summary judgment to the County on 
the procedural due process claims. It denied summary judgment, 
however, as to all other claims, including those against the individual 
County officers who had sought legislative or qualified immunity. See 
Acierno v. Cloutier, 1993 WL 215133 (D. Del. 1993). They appealed to 
this Court. A panel of the Third Circuit r eversed the denial of summary 
judgment to former officers, but found jurisdiction lacking in respect to 
the current officers. Upon motion for r ehearing, this Court, sitting en 
banc, vacated the panel decision, held that ther e was jurisdiction over 
both current and former officers, and r eversed the District Court's 
denial 
of summary judgment to them. See Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d 
Cir. 1994). The District Court conducted further proceedings, and on 
May 23, 2000, it granted summary judgment to the County on some of 
Acierno's outstanding claims. See Acier no v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 
92-385 (D. Del. 2000). 
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waiving its rights to refuse coverage later . Over the following 
year, legal expenses mounted and in May 1994, National 
Union filed suit against the County, seeking a declaration 
that it was not obligated to continue coverage. New Castle 
contested the claim, but the parties eventually settled, 
agreeing to a buy-out of the POL policy. The agreement 
resolved the dispute over the POL policy, but expressly did 
not address the CGL policy. 
 
On June 13, 1996, New Castle sent a letter to National 
Union renewing its request for coverage of its legal 
expenses and liability under the CGL policy. National Union 
denied coverage, and in response, the Countyfiled this 
declaratory judgment action. On December 30, 1997, the 
District Court granted National Union's motion for 
summary judgment, holding that Acierno's suit, and its 
associated expenses and liabilities, were not covered by the 
CGL policy. Specifically, the court held that National Union 
was only obligated to defend New Castle in suits arising 
from one of the policy's enumerated "personal injuries." The 
only arguably applicable provision, Definition 10(c), defines 
"personal injury" as a harm resulting from: 
 
       c. The wrongful eviction from, wr ongful entry into, or 
       invasion of the right of private occupancy of a 
       room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies 
       by or on behalf of its owner, landlor d or lessor; . . . 
 
The District Court held that this definition was 
unambiguous and required the County to act as an "owner, 
landlord or lessor" of Acierno's pr operty. Because it had 
not, the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
National Union. The District Court did not addr ess whether 
Acierno's claims constituted an "invasion of the right of 
private occupancy." 
 
New Castle appealed, and we reversed. See New Castle 
County v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 338, 342 
(3d Cir. 1999). We held that the "by or on behalf of " 
language of Definition 10(c) was ambiguous and should not 
be construed to preclude coverage.2  We therefore remanded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties disagreed over which wor ds the disputed language 
modified. National Union argued that the language modified the wrongful 
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the case to determine whether New Castle's alleged actions 
could constitute an "invasion of [Acier no's] right of private 
occupancy." Id. at 352. The District Court, on remand, 
again ruled against the County, granting summary 
judgment in favor of National Union. It held that the plain 
meaning of the "invasion" language was ambiguous, but 
that its context suggested it "should be construed to 
encompass only those actions of the same general type or 
class as `wrongful eviction' and `wr ongful entry.' " Because 
Acierno failed to allege an eviction, wr ongful entry, or 
similar injury, the District Court held that the CGL policy 




Jurisdiction is premised upon diversity of citizenship. 
Therefore, we must apply the substantive law of Delaware. 
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 
82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The sole issue for review is whether 
Acierno's claims, if true, constitute an "invasion of [his] 
right of private occupancy." If they do, the CGL policy 
requires National Union to cover the County's legal 
expenses and liability. This is a legal question of 
contractual interpretation. Because the Delawar e Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
acts. Under its interpretation, an eviction, entry, or invasion must be 
committed by the "owner, landlord or lessor" of the premises. At oral 
argument, counsel for National Union suggested that a proper reading of 
the definition required one to stop and"breathe" between the words 
"occupies" and "by." The same ef fect is achieved by ignoring a number 
of words: 
 
       The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the 
       right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises . . . by 
or 
       on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor; . . . 
 
New Castle, on the other hand, argued that the language modified the 
words that immediately preceded it ("that a person occupies"). According 
to New Castle, the disputed language described "the possessory interest 
of the person aggrieved." New Castle Co., 174 F.3d at 346. The wrongful 
acts must be committed against a person who has the right to occupy 
the premises. We found both interpretations reasonable, and therefore 
held the language was ambiguous. 
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Court has yet to address the issue directly, we must predict 
how it would rule. See New Castle County v. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999); Epstein 
Family P'ship v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
The District Court construed the CGL policy narr owly 
and granted summary judgment in favor of National Union. 
Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See New Castle County, 174 F.3d at 
342; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F .2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 
A. Delaware Insurance Law 
 
This is the second time that we have reviewed allegedly 
ambiguous language in Definition 10(c) of the CGL policy. 
See New Castle County, 174 F.3d at 344-51. The previous 
panel's discussion of Delaware law pertaining to insurance 
policy interpretation is a good starting point for our 
analysis: 
 
       Before an insurer is obligated to defend or indemnify a 
       policyholder, the insured must demonstrate that 
       coverage is available under the policy. An insur er's 
       duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify, 
       but `is limited to suits which assert claims for which it 
       has assumed liability under the policy.' `[W]here there 
       exists some doubt as to whether the complaint against 
       the insured alleges a risk insured against, that doubt 
       should be resolved in favor of the insur ed.' Most 
       importantly therefore, an insurer is`required to defend 
       any action which potentially states a claim which is 
       covered under the policy.' Thus, in this case, if the 
       Acierno actions potentially state a claim that is covered 
       under definition 10(c), National is requir ed to defend 
       the county in those actions. 
 
       Whether the Acierno actions potentially state a claim 
       for which National has assumed liability depends upon 
       how we interpret definition 10(c). As a basic matter, 
       Delaware law requires us to interpr et insurance 
       contracts `in a common sense manner.' W e must also 
 
                                7 
  
       examine the disputed language in the context of the 
       entire policy. 
 
       `Absent some ambiguity, Delaware courts will not 
       destroy or twist policy language under the guise of 
       construing it,' because `creating an ambiguity where 
       none exists could, in effect, create a new contract with 
       rights, liabilities and duties to which the parties ha[ve] 
       not assented.' When policy language is ambiguous, 
       however, under Delaware law this Court must apply 
       the doctrine of contra proferentem . That is, ambiguous 
       language must be construed against the drafter and in 
       conformance with the reasonable expectations of the 
       insured. 
 
       The premise underlying the principle of contra 
       proferentem is that an insurance contract is one of 
       adhesion. As the Delaware Supreme Court r ecently 
       explained, 
 
       [T]he insurer . . . is the entity in control of the 
       process of articulating the terms [of an insurance 
       contract]. The other party . . . usually has very little 
       to say about those terms except to take them or 
       leave them or to select from limited options of fered 
       by the insurer. . . . Therefor e, it is incumbent upon 
       the dominant party to make the terms clear . 
       Convoluted or confusing terms are the pr oblem of 
       the insurer . . . not the insured. . . . 
 
       As noted earlier, due to the insurer's dominant 
       position, when an ambiguity is found in insurance 
       policy language, we must construe the language 
       against the insurer as a matter of Delawar e law. And 
       therefore, unlike with other types of contracts, we need 
       not inquire into the parties' actual intent. 
 
       Because ambiguous language is construed against the 
       insurer as a matter of law, we take special note of 
       Delaware law for determining whether language is 
       ambiguous. `The settled test for ambiguity is whether 
       the provisions in controversy are r easonably or fairly 
       susceptible of different interpretations or may have two 
       or more different meanings.' An insurance policy is not 
       ambiguous, however, `merely because two conflicting 
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       interpretations may be suggested. Rather , both 
       interpretations must reflect a r easonable reading of the 
       contractual language.' Thus, we must examine, not 
       only whether the county's reading of definition 10(c) is 
       possible, but also whether it is reasonable. 
 
New Castle County, 174 F.3d at 342-44 (citations omitted). 
Thus, in order to assess National Union's obligations, 
Delaware law requires us to ask whether the Acierno suits 
potentially state a claim under Definition 10(c) of the CGL 
policy. See id. at 343. We must answer in the affirmative if 
the language of the policy is ambiguous as to its coverage 
of the specific claims. An insurance policy is ambiguous if 
there is more than one reasonable interpretation of its 
terms. The Delaware Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether an "invasion of the right of private occupancy" is 
ambiguous, and both parties agree that lower court 
opinions in the state provide no clear answer . As a result, 
we must look outside of Delaware, to other state court 
decisions and relevant public policy, to r each a decision.3 
 
B. Non-Delaware Precedent 
 
State courts outside of Delaware have disagr eed over 
whether an "invasion of the right of private occupancy" is 
ambiguous. A number of state courts have found the 
disputed language unambiguous, suggesting that it is 
inapplicable to Acierno's claims. A smaller , but not 
insignificant, number of decisions have held the opposite -- 
that an invasion of the right of private occupancy is 
ambiguous and must therefore be construed liberally. 
 
Of the decisions that hold the language to be 
unambiguous, most adopt one of three lines of r easoning. 
These approaches, however, are not sharply defined and 
often blur. The first and perhaps most commonly employed 
strategy is to examine the context in which the phrase is 
used (it almost always follows some variation of"wrongful 
eviction" and "wrongful entry"). States cite the Latin maxim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Both parties refer extensively to dictionary definitions and the "plain 
meaning" of the terms. Not surprisingly, their arguments conflict and are 
ultimately inconclusive. As a result, we find this discussion unhelpful. 
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"ejusdem generis," a tool of construction that applies when 
a general term or phrase follows an enumeration of specific 
offenses.4 Ejusdem generis requires courts to construe the 
general phrase narrowly, so that it relates only to offenses 
of the same kind or class as those specifically enumerated. 
As the Delaware Supreme Court clearly articulated over 
eighty years ago in Donaghy v. State, 100 A. 696, 707 (Del. 
1917): 
 
       The doctrine of ejusdem generis . . . is a rule of 
       statutory construction . . . that where general words 
       follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons 
       or things, the general words will be construed as 
       applicable only to persons or things of the same 
       general nature or class as those enumerated. . . . 
       [S]uch a rule is based on the obvious r eason that if it 
       was intended that the general words should be used in 
       their unrestricted sense, no mention would have been 
       made of the particular classes. 
 
See also Triple C Railcar Serv., Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 
630 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1993). Applying ejusdem generis 
would limit the right of private occupancy to of fenses, 
similar to eviction or wrongful entry, that include a 
violation of the claimant's possessory inter est in real 
property. See Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329 
Or. 303, 312-14 (1999) ("[T]he phrase,`other invasion of the 
right of private occupancy' applies only to of fenses that 
involve a possessory interest in the pr emises at issue.").5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. They also cite a "related" canon of construction, noscitur a sociis. 
Only 
the amicus, however, presents a case that applies the concept. In City of 
Delray Beach, 85 F.3d at 1534, the Eleventh Circuit refers to a Florida 
state court decision that suggests that the two Latin maxims are more 
than simply "related": 
 
       [Ejusdem generis] is actually an application of the broader maxim 
       `noscitur a sociis' which means that general and specific words 
       capable of analogous meaning when associated together take color 
       from each other so that the general wor ds are restricted to a 
sense 
       analogous to the specific words. 
 
Thus, noscitur a sociis is simply a br oad form of ejusdem generis and 
requires no additional analysis. 
 
5. In addition to Oregon, other states that have utilized ejusdem generis 
in a similar context include Wisconsin, Florida, Massachusetts, Indiana, 
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Because Acierno's claims do not allege a violation of his 
possessory interest, adopting this appr oach would require 
us to rule in favor of National Union. 
 
There is a critical distinction, however , between this case 
and most of the decisions that apply ejusdem generis. 
Almost all of the precedent invoking the Latin maxim 
involve insurance policies that include the phrase"other 
invasion of the right of private occupancy." Some courts 
have explicitly focused on the presence of the word "other": 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Michigan, Illinois, Oklahoma, California, and New York. See United 
States v. Security Mgmt. Co., Inc., 96 F .3d 260, 264 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(applying Wisconsin law and holding that"[t]he ejusdem generis rule 
makes clear that [a] right of occupancy must exist before an individual 
may be said to have suffered an `invasion of the right of private 
occupancy' "); City of Delray Beach, Florida v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 85 
F.3d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Florida law and holding that 
"when read in context, the phrase `other invasion of the right of private 
occupancy' means an offense tantamount to wr ongful entry or eviction 
and requires an impingement upon possessory rights); Dryden Oil Co. of 
New England, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 91 F.3d 278, 288 (1st Cir. 
1996) (applying ejusdem generis under Massachusetts law); Red Ball 
Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 312 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (applying ejusdem generis under Indiana law); Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 933 F .Supp. 675, 680 (E.D. Mich. 
1996) (interpreting Michigan law as adopting ejusdem generis); Martin v. 
Brunzelle, 699 F.Supp. 167, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Ejusdem generis 
principles draw on the sensible notion that wor ds such as `or other 
invasion of the right of private occupancy' ar e intended to encompass 
actions of the same general type as, though not specifically embraced 
within, `wrongful entry or eviction.' "); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. East 
Central Oklahoma Elec. Coop., 97 F.3d 383, 390-91 (Okla. 1996) 
("Instead of creating an ambiguity, the ter m `invasion of the right of 
private occupancy' is included in insurance policies simply to provide a 
`catch-all' category of offenses of the same general type as "wrongful 
entry or eviction."); Stein-Brief Group, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 65 
Cal.App.4th 364, 373 (1998); County of Columbia v. Continental Ins. Co., 
595 N.Y.S.2d 988, 991 (1993) ("By application of the principle of ejusdem 
generis, the key to interpreting the phrase`other invasion of the right of 
private occupancy' lies in the definition of `wrongful entry' and 
`eviction,' 
both of which involve actual interference with possessory rights to real 
property."). 
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       [T]his court has stated that `the rule of ejusdem generis 
       in contracts is peculiarly applicable where specific 
       enumeration precedes the word `other' followed by 
       general words. . . . use of the term`other' to connect 
       the phrase `invasion of the right of private occupancy' 
       to the wording that precedes it satisfies us that the 
       parties intended that such invasion also be limited to 
       claims that involve a possessory interest in the 
       premises. 
 
Groshong, 329 Or. at 313-14; see also, e.g., Liberty Mutual, 
97 F.3d at 390; Security Mgmt., 96 F .3d at n.4 (applying 
ejusdem generis, but noting that its application"would 
have more force if the word `other' preceded the general 
term."). The policy at issue in this case does not include the 
word "other." 
 
Neither National Union nor the amicus address this 
distinction, or why the principle should be applied. Instead, 
the amicus conclusively states, without further elaboration, 
that "[e]mploying the principle of ejusdem generis, rather 
than contra proferentem, adher es to the requirement that 
words be interpreted in the proper context and ensures 
greater fidelity to the meaning of the disputed term and the 
intentions of the parties to the insurance contract."6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Contra proferentem is yet another Latin maxim, which requires that 
ambiguous and confusing policy language be construed against the 
insurer. The amicus suggests that the court must choose between 
applying contra preferentem and ejusdem generis. This is incorrect. 
Ejusdem generis is used to determine whether a phrase is ambiguous. 
Contra preferentem only applies after a determination of ambiguity is 
made. See Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1149-50 
(Del. 1997) ("[I]f the contract . . . is ambiguous, the principle of 
contra 
proferentem dictates that the contract must be construed against the 
drafter."). The County, in contrast, r ecognizes this distinction, but 
nonetheless argues that contra preferentem should be applied because 
the District Court explicitly found the disputed language ambiguous. See 
Appellant's brief at 26 ("[T]he District Court ignored the doctrine of 
contra 
proferentem and construed admittedly ambiguous policy language 
against the insured.") (emphasis added). This is also incorrect. The 
District Court merely found that the "plain meaning" of the phrase was 
ambiguous. It then examined the context of the language, applied 
ejusdem generis, and held that its meaning was clear. Before we can 
apply contra proferentem, we must first review this holding and 
determine whether the disputed phrase was ambiguous. 
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Amicus brief at 19 n.5. This begs the question, however, of 
whether applying ejusdem generis in this case would help 
clarify the parties' intentions. See White v. Cr owley, 1986 
WL 5850, *2 (Del.Super. 1986) ("As with all rules of 
statutory construction, [ejusdem generis] does not apply 
when the context shows a contrary intention. In other 
words, the goal of statutory construction is tofind the 
intent of the [contracting parties], and rules of statutory 
construction are merely means towar d that end."). Because 
National Union has failed to demonstrate, and we fail to 
believe, that applying ejusdem generis is r equired or even 
helpful, our inquiry must continue. 
 
Under the second approach, some states have concluded, 
after reviewing the entirety of a policy, that an "invasion of 
the right of private occupancy" is only available in a 
landlord-tenant context. See Dryden Oil Co. of New 
England, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Company , 91 F.3d 278, 
288 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Under Massachusetts law, then, the 
phrase `other invasion of the right of private occupancy' 
would mean `other invasion of the [tenant's] right of private 
occupancy,' since an actionable `wrongful entry or eviction' 
claim under Massachusetts law may be brought only by a 
tenant against a landlord.").7  There is no landlord-tenant 
relationship in this case. However, New Castle cites a long 
list of cases that have rejected this position. See Appellant's 
Brief at 20 n.5. There is no need to discuss each of these 
cases, except to note that a number of states allow a 
property owner, like Mr. Acier no, to bring such a claim.8 
 
Third, some states have held that an "invasion of the 
right of private occupancy" requires a physical invasion, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Burkhardt, 96 F.Supp.2d 1343, 
1351 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (applying Alabama law); Decorative Ctr. v. 
Employers Cas., 833 S.W.2d 257, 262 (T ex.App. 1992) ("The phrase 
`other invasion of the right of private occupancy' provides coverage only 
if there exists a landlord-tenant r elationship, or if the plaintiff has a 
vested property right."). 
 
8. See, e.g., Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic 
Med., 191 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1999); Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund 
v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1992); Titan 
Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F .2d 265, 272-73 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
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such as a trespass. See Sterling Builders, Inc. v. United 
National Ins. Co., 79 Cal.App.4th 105, 108-09 (2000) 
("[T]here is no such thing as a `non-physical invasion' of a 
right of private occupancy. `Occupancy' r equires a physical 
entry upon real property."). Accor ding to this line of 
reasoning, merely impinging upon a claimant's right to use 
or enjoy real property does not constitute such an invasion. 
See Columbia National Ins. v. Pacesetter Homes, Inc. , 532 
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Neb. 1995) ("[T]he right of private occupancy 
is the legal right to occupy premises, not the right to enjoy 
occupying those premises.").9 Acierno does not allege a 
physical invasion of any sort, and therefor e his claims 
would not qualify. 
 
A smaller, but not insignificant, number of decisions 
support New Castle's position. Although less unifor m in 
their approach, these decisions, in aggr egate, address each 
of National Union's arguments. First, some courts have 
held that an "invasion of the right of private occupancy" is 
ambiguous as a matter of law.10 The most factually relevant 
decisions are those of New Hampshire. In Town of Goshen 
v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 424 A.2d 822, 825 (N.H. 1980), a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The amicus makes a related argument by distinguishing between use 
and occupancy. See Amicus brief at 10-16 (contending that the County's 
policy only covers suits arising out of harm to a claimant's occupancy, 
whereas Acierno's suits claim damages r elating to future use). For 
authority, the amicus relies primarily upon a number of Delaware 
statutes that refer to "use or occupancy." According to the amicus, the 
presence of both terms indicates that "use" and "occupancy" are distinct 
concepts. We find this unconvincing. In all of the examples presented, 
the two words consistently appear together , amidst a long list of other 
concepts. It is equally reasonable to conclude that the legislature used 
the two words as synonyms. 
 
10. See, e.g., Beltway Mgmt. Co. v. Lexington-Landmark Ins. Co., 746 
F.Supp. 1145, 1150 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The phrase `other invasion of the 
right of private occupancy' is ambiguous."); Gould Inc. v. Arkwright Mut. 
Ins. Co., 829 F.Supp. 722, 729 (M.D. Pa 1993) ("We, therefore, find that 
the personal injury endorsement with its coverage for `wrongful entry' 
and `other invasion of the right of private occupancy', is, in the context 
of the entire policy, . . . ambiguous."); Hirschberg v. Lumbermans Mut. 
Cas., 798 F.Supp. 600, 604 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("At a minimum, the term 
`other invasion of the right of private occupancy' is ambiguous, and any 
ambiguity is to be resolved against the insur er.") 
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property owner sued a town planning boar d for refusing to 
allow him to develop a subdivision. He claimed civil rights 
violations under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The supr eme court of 
the state held that the town's insurance policy, which 
covered suits arising from "other invasion of the right of 
private occupancy," was unclear. As a r esult, it construed 
the policy against the insurer and held that coverage 
extended to damages arising from the boar d's denial of 
"plaintiff 's right to free enjoyment of his property." See id. 
at 824-25. Later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
applying New Hampshire law, held that "other invasion of 
the right of private occupancy" included har m resulting 
from "noxious odors, noise and light" that interfered with 
the use of property. See Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. 
City of Keene, New Hampshire, 898 F .2d 265, 272-73 (1st 
Cir. 1990). The Court noted that, "T own of Goshen does not 
require an allegation of physical invasion before a claim 
comes within coverage for liability arising fr om `other 
invasion of the right of private occupancy.' " Id. at 273. 
 
Although a number of states have criticized or r efused to 
follow Town of Goshen, see Sterling Builders, 79 
Cal.App.4th at 110-11, others have reached the same 
conclusion. The Supreme Court of Washington has held 
that both nuisance and trespass claims qualify as "other 
invasion[s] of the right of private occupancy." See Kitsap 
County v. Allstate Ins. Co., 964 P.2d 1173, 1185-86 (Wash. 
1998). In Kitsap, the court noted that the"plain, ordinary, 
and popular meaning that an average purchaser of 
insurance would ascribe to the phrase `other invasion of the 
right of private occupancy' would include a tr espass on or 
against a person's right to use premises or land." Id. at 
1185 (emphasis added). The court also consider ed and 
rejected the application of ejusdem generis . 
 
Even California, which has almost unifor mly rejected 
New Hampshire's approach, has occasionally softened its 
interpretation of the disputed language. In Martin Marietta 
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 40 Cal.App.4th 
1113, 1134 (1996), a state court of appeal held that" `other 
invasion of the right of private occupancy' is susceptible to 
numerous interpretations, and under California's rules of 
contract interpretation, it must be construed in favor of the 
 
                                15 
  
insured." The case involved environmental claims by federal 
and state entities against Martin Marietta. 
 
Finally, some courts have held the language at issue is 
ambiguous simply because of the wide variance among 
judicial decisions. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Summit Corp. 
of America, 715 N.E.2d 926, 937-38 (Ind. 1999) ("This 
disagreement among the courts further indicates the 
ambiguity of the personal injury provisions."). We have, in 
the past, adopted a similar, practical appr oach. See Little v. 
MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 (3r d Cir. 1987) 
("[T]hat different courts have arrived at conflicting 
interpretations of the policy is strongly indicative of the 
policy's essential ambiguity."). 
 
In sum, a review of relevant, non-Delawar e case law, 
suggests that there is a greater number of cases favoring 
National Union's position. However, "our job is not simply 
to count the number of cases on both sides," New Castle 
County, 174 F.3d at 347. We must instead evaluate the 
underlying reasoning. Reducing counsels' many arguments 
to their most persuasive essence, we believe that the 
existing non-Delaware caselaw can be characterized as 
follows: on one hand, a fairly large number of state court 
decisions apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis  and find no 
ambiguity; on the other, a smaller number of decisions rely 
upon either broad, conclusory language or narr ow, fact- 
specific analysis to reach the opposite r esult. We find 
neither approach convincing. As a result, we turn to public 
policy concerns and commonsense. 
 
C. Public Policy and Commonsense 
 
Of the three briefs submitted in this case, only the 
amicus attempts a public policy argument: 
 
       [C]ourts create great uncertainty when they disregard 
       express, unambiguous provisions defining and 
       circumscribing the risks that the insur er agrees to 
       cover. Failure to enforce the insurance contract as 
       written can affect the price and availability of coverage 
       for those who lack the resources to self-insure -- most 
       notably, individuals and small businesses. 
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Amicus brief at 25 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We 
completely agree with this statement. In fact, one would be 
hard-pressed to find anyone to disagree. The problem is 
that this statement assumes away the central issue in this 
case - whether the disputed policy language is ambiguous. 
It is beyond peradventure, as the amicus contends, that 
"[i]nsurance serves an important economic and social 
function," and courts must enforce unambiguous policy 
language in order to maintain its viability. The question 
remains, however, whether the CGL policy is unambiguous, 
and none of the parties provides any policy ar guments for 
addressing that particular question. 
 
In our opinion, the most important and relevant 
observation in this case was only casually r eferenced by the 
District Court. The court noted: 
 
       Insurance companies have included the clause 
       `wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion 
       of the right of private occupancy' in their policies for at 
       least twenty years, and litigants have repeatedly 
       disputed the meaning of the term `invasion of the right 
       of private occupancy.' . . . 
 
       After at least two decades of litigation over the meaning 
       of the term `invasion of the right of private occupancy,' 
       courts have not arrived at a uniform definition of the 
       term. Rather than attempt to construe the ter m 
       `invasion of the right of private occupancy' solely based 
       on its plain meaning, courts have concluded that the 
       term is ambiguous, and have resorted to other 
       techniques of contract interpretation. This court, 
       similarly will examine the meaning of the ter m in the 
       broader context of the CGL policy. 
 
       Insurance companies continue to employ the ter m 
       `invasion of the right of private occupancy' in their 
       policies, despite twenty years of legal decisionsfinding 
       that this term is ambiguous. It is instructive to ask 
       why. 
 
We also find it instructive to ask "why?" -- because we 
cannot conceive of an answer. The District Court concluded 
that insurance companies intend the disputed language to 
be read in context, to take meaning from the specific terms 
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it follows (almost always "wrongful eviction" and "wrongful 
entry"). Perhaps this is true. But even if it is, their intent 
has been, and continues to be, unclear. 
 
A Westlaw search from 1973 to the present reveals 249 
cases that include the phrase "invasion of the right of 
private occupancy." Approximately half of those decisions 
required a direct interpretation of the disputed language. In 
fact, National Union itself has been forced to litigate the 
meaning of the phrase on numerous occasions, and has 
lost at least four times.11 Yet, in spite of this extensive 
history of litigation, and obvious disagreement amongst 
courts and parties alike, insurance companies, and 
National Union in particular, continue to use the phrase 
without any language defining its scope. Once again, we 
must ask, "why?" 
 
It is well settled under Delaware law that insurance 
policies are contracts of adhesion. Ther efore it is the 
responsibility of the insurer to write clear policies with 
adequately defined terms: 
 
       [Insurance contracts] must be interpreted in a common 
       sense manner, giving effect to all pr ovisions so that a 
       reasonable policyholder can understand the scope and 
       limitation of coverage. It is the obligation of the insurer 
       to state clearly the terms of the policy . . .. 
 
       The policy behind this principle is that the insur er or 
       the issuer, as the case may be, is the entity in control 
       of the process of articulating the terms. The other 
       party, whether it be the ordinary insur ed or the 
       investor, usually has very little say about those terms 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See Kitsap County, 964 P.2d at 1184-86; Rozet v. City Ins. Co., 24 
F.3d 249 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished decision); Great Northern Nekoosa 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 921 F .Supp. 401, 416-18 (N.D. Miss. 
1996); Gould, 829 F.Supp. at 724, 729. National Union has, on other 
occasions, prevailed in similar suits. See e.g., City of Oakland v. 
National 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa , 56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(unpublished opinion); Wackenhut Servs., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15 F .Supp.2d 1314, 1323-24 (S.D. Fla. 
1998); Stein-Brief, 65 Cal.App.4th at 368, 373; O'Brien Energy Sys., Inc. 
v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 957, 959, 963-63 (Pa.Super. 
1993). 
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       except to take them or leave them or to select fr om 
       limited options offered by the insur er or issuer. 
       Therefore, it is incumbent upon the dominant party to 
       make terms clear. Convoluted or confusing terms are 
       the problem of the insurer or issuer -- not the insured. 
 
Penn Mutual, 695 A.2d at 1149-50. Because of the one- 
sided nature of insurance policies, insurance companies 
are in the best position to clarify potentially ambiguous 
terms and avoid future disputes. The persistent litigation 
surrounding the meaning of "invasion of the right of private 
occupancy" strongly suggests that they indeed should do 
so. A simple definition of the phrase, indicating, for 
example, that it refers only to offenses requiring a physical 
invasion (or only to those involving a tenant-landlord 
dispute, etc.) would be dispositive. 
 
At oral argument, we asked counsel why National Union 
had chosen not to further define the contested phrase. 
Counsel responded that "this phraseology makes the policy 
marketable." In response to our follow-up question, counsel 
denied that the phrase was "marketable" solely because it 
created confusion; instead, he stated that"the purpose of 
this policy language is that it covers fact patter ns and 
situations and scenarios that don't narrowly fall within the 
parameters of a `wrongful entry' or `wr ongful eviction.' " 
Even if this is true, we fail to see how further defining the 
scope of the language would undercut this purpose. If 
anything, it would help clarify which fact patter ns, 
situations, and scenarios are indeed cover ed. We will not 
speculate as to why National Union has consistently 
refused to clarify its language, but one thing is clear: The 
provision at issue in the National Union CGL policy is 
ambiguous. 
 
There is a time and place for reliance upon Latin maxims 
and principles of statutory construction, but not at the 
expense of commonsense. See SI Mgmt. L.P . v. Wininger, 
707 A.2d 37, 42 (Del. 1998) (holding that insurance 
contracts "must be interpreted in a common sense manner, 
giving effect to all provisions so that a reasonable 
policyholder can understand the scope and limitation of 
coverage. It is the obligation of the insurer to state clearly 
the terms of the policy."). A single phrase, which insurance 
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companies have consistently refused to define, and that has 
generated literally hundreds of lawsuits, with widely varying 
results, cannot, under our application of commonsense, be 
termed unambiguous. As such, we hold that an"invasion 
of the right of private occupancy" must be construed 
liberally, and that the CGL policy does cover the County's 
legal expenses and its liability arising from Acierno's 
claims. 
 
We reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of National Union, and remand the cause 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Because I would affirm the judgment of the District 
Court, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Acierno sued New Castle County alleging that its denial 
of a building permit unlawfully deprived him of his property 
without due process of law and that it arbitrarily treated 
him differently than other real estate developers in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Acierno also alleged that the County violated 
his rights to due process and equal protection when it 
voided his development plan and rezoned his pr operty. 
Contending Acierno alleges an "invasion of the right of 
private occupancy," the County maintains National Union 
Fire Insurance Company has a duty to defend. In essence, 
the County asserts that Acierno alleged that the County's 
regulatory actions impaired Acierno's right to use and enjoy 
his property.1 
 
Interpreting the policy, the District Court denied a "duty 
to defend" holding that "personal injury" does not extend to 
claims involving frustrated commercial expectations 
regarding future development of pr operty. After declining to 
construe the term "invasion of the right of private 
occupancy" on a plain meaning reading, the District Court 
employed the well known tools of construction of ejusdem 
generis and noscitur a sociis. 
 
As the District Court recognized, the ter m "invasion of 
the right of private occupancy" follows the enumeration of 
specific actions relating to possessory inter ests in real 
property -- wrongful eviction and wr ongful entry.2 It would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As noted, the Commercial General Liability policy purchased from 
National Union Fire Insurance provides in part: 
 
       10. "Personal injury" means injury, other than "bodily injury," 
       arising out of one or more of the following of fenses: 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       c. The wrongful eviction from, wr ongful entry into, or invasion of 
       the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that 
       a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner , landlord or 
lessor. 
 
2. See Sadler v. New Castle County, 565 A.2d 917, 923 (Del. 1989); 
Hercules, Inc. v. Virginia, 1999 WL 167830, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 12, 
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seem, therefore, that applying a br oader definition, would 
expand coverage beyond the intended scope of the policy 
language. 
 
The related doctrine of noscitur a sociis 3 also points to the 
conclusion that when read in context, the phrase "invasion 
of the right of occupancy" should be given a meaning 
analogous to "wrongful eviction" and"wrongful entry." The 
phrase "invasion of the right of private occupancy" does not 
appear to encompass financial harms like the denial of a 
building permit, the voiding of a development plan, and the 
rezoning of land. 
 
Acierno alleges that the County improperly deprived him 
of his right to use and enjoy his land. He makes no 
allegations of eviction, entry or similar wr ongful 
disturbance. 
 
The District Court found: 
 
       that the coverage of the CGL policy does not extend to 
       the County's liabilities arising from the Acierno 
       litigation. This conclusion is consistent with the nature 
       of the insurance policies purchased by the County. The 
       County bought a POL4 policy fr om National Union to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1999) ("Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, 
by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are 
not to be construed in their widest extent, but ar e to be held as 
applying 
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned."). 
3. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis holds that "general and specific 
words 
capable of the analogous meaning when associated together take color 
from each other so that the general wor ds are restricted to a sense 
analogous to the specific words." City of Delray Beach v. Agric. Ins. Co., 
85 F.3d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996). 
4. The District Court found that "in 1992, National Union sold the 
County a Public Officials and Employees Liability Insurance Policy 
(Policy No. 439-12-94) (the "POL policy"). The POL policy has a $1 million 
limit of liability for the policy period May 12, 1992 to July 1, 1993. The 
POL policy excludes coverage for claims arising fr om prior litigation, 
stating that National Union shall not be made liable to make any 
payment in connection with any claim for any wr ongful act occurring 
prior to May 12, 1992, for which the County might r easonably expect 
that such wrongful act would give rise to a claim." New Castle County v. 
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 84 F.Supp.2d 550, 552 (D. Del. 2000). 
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       insure it against potential liabilities arising from the 
       conduct of its officials and employees. Although the 
       parties disagreed whether the "prior litigation" 
       exclusion of the POL policy obligated National Union to 
       indemnify the County for the Acierno litigation, there is 
       no dispute that the POL policy covers the kinds of 
       liabilities incurred by the County in its zoning and 
       permitting activities. Recognizing that the County had 
       already insured itself under the POL policy against 
       liabilities arising from the exercise of its regulatory 
       authority, it is not surprising that its CGL policy covers 
       a different set of potential liabilities. 
 
New Castle, 84 F.Supp.2d at 556. 
 
Substantially for the reasons set forth by the District 
Court, I would affirm its judgment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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